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Abstract. Real-world large-scale data collection poses an important
challenge in the security field. Insider and masquerader attack data col-
lection poses even a greater challenge. Very few organizations acknowl-
edge such breaches because of liability concerns and potential implica-
tions on their market value. This caused the scarcity of real-world data
sets that could be used to study insider and masquerader attacks. In
this paper, we present the design, technical, and procedural challenges
encountered during our own masquerade data gathering project. We also
share some lessons learned from this several-year project related to the
Institutional Review Board process and to user study design.
1 Introduction
Lack of large-scale, real-world data has hindered the development of effective
intrusion detection systems for the detection of insider attacks. Most organiza-
tions that undergo such types of attacks prefer not to announce them publicly
out of liability and confidentiality concerns. According to the 2010 cyber crime
watch survey, which was conducted by the Computer Emergency Response Team
(CERT), and which surveyed 523 security executives and law enforcement of-
ficials, 72% of the insider incidents that occurred at the surveyed isntituions
were handled internally without legal action or the involvement of law enforce-
ment [3]. Another 13% of the insider incidents are handled internally with some
legal action. Announcing such attacks may also have market share implications.
For the same reasons, they are even less likely to share real-world data that could
be used to study such attacks with the research community.
The study of masquerade attacks, a class of insider attacks in which a user
of a system illegitimately poses as, or assumes the identity of another legiti-
mate user, suffers similarly from the scarcity of real-world data, despite their
significance. According to the 2010 cyber crime watch survey [3], 35% of the
surveyed executives and law enforcement officials experienced unauthorized ac-
cess and use of their information, systems, and networks. This type of intrusion,
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known as a masquerade attack, was second in the top five list of electronic crimes
perpetrated by outsiders after virus, worms and other malicious code attacks.
In the absence of a real-world data set for the study of masquerade attacks,
we had to launch our own data collection project. In this paper we present the
methodology followed to gather our own data set for the evaluation of masquer-
ade attack detection techniques. We discuss the challenges encountered during
the collection and analysis of the data set. The rest of this paper is organized
as follows. In Section 2, we describe the objectives of the masquerade attack
data collection project. Section 3 covers the challenges encountered during the
different phases of the data collection project, including design, procedural, and
technical challenges. In Section 4, we present the lessons learned throughout the
masquerade data gathering project. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper by
summarizing the main points of the paper.
2 Project Objectives
In the case of masquerade attack detection, most detection approaches used ma-
chine learning techniques to profile normal user behavior, and detect abnormal
behavior that could be indicative of a masquerade attack. The vast majority of
these techniques were evaluated using the the Schonlau dataset [6], gathered by
Mathias Schonlau [2]. This dataset suffers from several shortcomings. The first
shortcoming is the absence of any command arguments. Only simple commands
have been collected. Another weakness is the lack of timestamps that indicate
when the user commands were issued. No indication is available as to what time
period is covered by the 15,000 commands collected from each user. It could take
one user a few days to issue this number of commands, when it takes another a
few months to do the same. This indicates another shortcoming of this dataset,
namely the heterogeneity of the users. Not all users have the same expertise with
Unix commands, nor do they have the same job functions. The wide variety of
backgrounds amongst the users causes differences in their behaviors, such as the
variety of commands that they use.
While all of the above shortcomings of the Schonlau dataset are important,
perhaps the most significant weakness of this dataset is the lack of real mas-
querader data. All of the user command sequences gathered in this dataset
were issued by normal users performing their regular day-to-day jobs. No com-
mand sequences were issued by attackers. Masquerade attacks were simulated by
randomly inserting excerpts of command sequence from one user into the com-
mand sequences issued by another user. This practically turned the masquerade
attack detection exercise into an author identification exercise. The fact that
the command sequences belong to users with widely varying Unix proficiency
and different job description further weakens the accuracy results achieved by
the proposed “masquerade attack” detection classifiers, which have been only
evaluated in an “author identification” exercise.
In order to overcome these weaknesses, we launched an initiative to collect
our own dataset for masquerade attack detection and to make it available for
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the broader research community. We call this dataset the RUU (Are You You?)
dataset [1]. The tasks consisted of gathering computer usage data belonging to
a large homogeneous set of normal users, and simulating masquerader attacks.
Each task posed its own challenges. However, both tasks were subject to the




The major procedural challenge encountered during the concept phase of our
data collection project was the IRB process. Obtaining IRB approval to conduct
user studies is a costly process, bot in time and effort. During the IRB process,
the research plan and objectives including the detailed description of the planned
experiments are reviewed in advance in order to protect the privacy rights of
the human subjects involved in the research. This process is required in all
institutions that receive research funding from the US federal government. It
is a lengthy process and may be iterative in some cases, as some clarifications
may be requested by the IRB. For example, we had to submit the exact text of
the call for participation to students in our user studies. We had to specify in
advance what pieces of data we anticipated to collect, for how many users, and
for how long. We did not necessarily know the answers to all of these questions
when we initiated the IRB review process. In order to continue working on the
project, we had to extend or re-initiate the review processes on several occasions.
3.2 Design Challenges
Once the user studies were approved, we could run our experiments. We sim-
ulated masquerade attacks by developing a very specific attack scenario, which
user study participants had to follow. The masquerade attack scenario had to
be: 1) representative of masquerade attacks, i.e. generalizable, and 2) easily ex-
ecutable in a user study. The latter condition meant that the execution of the
masquerader scenario had to be time-limited. Not specifying a time limit for the
attack adds a lot of uncontrolled variability to the experiments. Furthermore, it
makes the experiments costly both in participants and researcher time.
We developed an attack scenario, where the attacker gets an opportunity to
access a coworker’s computer during a 15-minute lunch break, while the coworker
leaves the office and stays logged in to their computer. In this scenario, we
described the financial difficulties that the masquerader was going through, and
the personal conflict that they had with the coworker. The attacker’s objective
was to find any information that could be used for financial gain. We strove
to ensure that the task of the user study participants was goal-oriented, thus
revealing the malicious intent of the attacker.
We conjectured that the malicious intent of a masquerader to steal informa-
tion will be manifested in the attacker’s search behavior when they access the
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victim’s computer. Our goal was to confirm this conjecture and to show that
the attacker’s search behavior is different from a normal user’s search behavior,
and that monitoring search behavior could be used for the detection of a mas-
querader’s attack. When we conducted the first user study, we only used the
’Malicious attacker”’ scenario described above. However, we soon realized that
we had to control the ‘user’s intent’ in order to ensure the validity of our exper-
iment and of the resulting collected data. To that extent, we conducted another
a second experiment, where the intent to leak information was the independent
variable that we controlled. Besides the ‘malicious attacker’ scenario described
above, we developed two other scenarios: a ‘benign masquerader’ scenario, and
a ‘neutral’ scenario. In the benign scenario, the participants experienced a hard
drive failure and could access a coworker’s computer while their coworker left out
for 15 minutes, in order to finish working on an urgent project. In the neutral
scenario, the participants in this scenario had no compelling reason to access the
co-worker’s computer. They were left to freely choose whether they wanted to
access their coworker’s desktop when the coworker left during a lunch break.
In order to increase the sensitivity of our experiment, we had to reduce
uncontrolled variability. This in turn requires controlling user bias which makes
up the largest source of error variance in user study experiments [4]. There are
three techniques used in behavioral sciences to reduce subject variability, or
user bias. The first and preferred technique is the use of the same subject in
all ‘treatment conditions’ of the experiment, that is in all three scenarios. This
procedure could not be used in our experiment as it undermined the assumption
that masqueraders were not familiar with the file system under attack. Using
the same subjects in different treatment conditions of the experiment means
that they will be exposed to the file system more than once. This implies that,
in the second and third treatment condition or scenario, the subjects have prior
knowledge about the file system, which introduces a new type of error in our
experiment.
The second approach and probably the most obvious approach is to select a
homogeneous group of subjects, i.e. subjects with similar characteristics that are
relevant to the experiment, such as their familiarity with the use of computers,
their ability to search for information in a file system, and their acuity or sense of
cyber-security. Finally, the third approach for reducing subject variability is the
use of several small subject sets with characteristics that are highly homogeneous
within one set, but widely varying between sets. We have chosen the second
approach, and selected subjects who were all students at the Computer Science
department of Columbia University, so that they have comparable skills. This
should minimize the variability between subject with respect to their familiarity
with computer usage, and how to search a desktop in order to steal information,
or how to perform a data theft attack without being detected. This should reduce
confounds and bias in the results of this user study.
To further reduce subject variability, we anticipated all questions that could
be raised by the participants and included answers to them in the user study
scenarios. The goal was to minimize any verbal communication between the
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researcher and the participant in the experiment. That ensured that all partici-
pants received the same instructions, thus minimizing the participant bias. One
may argue that simulating a masquerade attack is not appropriate, and that it
is hard for an innocent student to act as a masquerader. We argue that, if the
scenario of the experiment is well-written, and with very clear instructions, the
participants in the experiment will follow the instructions. To this extent, we
refer the reader to the very well-known Milgram experiment, which showed how
subjects obey an authority figure and blindly follow instructions, even when they
contradict their own values and ethics [5].
Besides reducing subject variability, we strove to reduce the experimental
treatment variability by presenting each user study participant with the same
experiment conditions. In particular, we used the same desktop and file system
in all experiments. We also ensured that the desktop accessed by the subjects
looked the same to each participant. In particular, we cleaned up the list of
recently accessed documents, and opened MS Office documents before the start
of each experiment, and automated the data collection and uploading to a file
server so that the data collected does not reside on the desktop used in the
experiment and does not bias the results of the experiment. Finally, we strove to
limit the number for unanalyzed control factors. For example, we ensured that
all the experiments were run by the same research assistant.
All of the aboves measures to reduce subject variability and control user
bias and attacker intent were not necessarily planned at the beginning of the
experiment. We leaned them the hard way. We had to redo the user studies and
hire new participants, thus increasing cost and effort.
3.3 Technical Challenges
To collect normal user data, we developed a first sensor that gathers user com-
mand data, including command arguments and timestamps. Recall that our ob-
jective is to collect a dataset that collects Unix and Linux user command data
from a homogeneous set of users and overcomes the weaknesses of the Schonlau
dataset. We built a first sensor for the Linux operating system. The sensor uses
a kernel hook to audit all events on the host. It collects all process IDs, process
names, and process command arguments in real time. The hooking mechanism
used is the auditd daemon included in most modern Linux distributions. When
we deployed the sensor, we could not get enough adopters. Most students on
campus did not run the Linux operating system on their personal computers.
Therefore, we had to develop a second sensor that runs on Windows systems.
This delayed the project by several months.
We developed a second sensor for the Windows XP platform. The Windows
sensor monitors all registry-based activity, process creation and destruction, win-
dow GUI access, and DLL libraries activity. The data gathered consists of the
process name and ID, the process path, the parent of the process, the type of
process action (e.g., type of registry access, process creation, process destruc-
tion, etc.), the process command arguments, action flags (success/failure), and
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registry activity results. A timestamp is also recorded for each action. The Win-
dows sensor uses a low-level system driver, DLL registration mechanisms, and
a system table hook to monitor user activity. It relies on hooks placed in the
Windows ServiceTable, which is a typical approach used by malicious rootkits.
In the first data collection round, we had about 15 volunteers who accepted
to install the sensor on their computers and to share the data collected about
their normal activities on the computer. All of these students were taking the
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) class at Columbia University. This sample
was not large enough to conduct experiments and achieve results with high
statistical significance. Therefore, we had to collect more data when the IDS
class was offered the following year. Meanwhile we had prepared a second sensor
for Windows Vista. Unfortunately, we realized that most students have upgraded
their operating systems from Windows XP to Windows 7 directly.
Developing a sensor for Windows 7 required rewriting the core parts of the
sensor, since Windows 7 no longer allowed placing hooks in the Windows Ser-
viceTable to intercept system calls. Moreover, the sensor could not run on 64-bit
versions of the Windows operating systems. Even certain updates to the oper-
ating system, such as the Windows XP Service Pack 3 (SP3), which includes
security, performance, and stability updates to Windows XP, caused the sensor
to crash in some instances. This caused our server to lose contact with some user
sensors. The data collected for some users covered only intermittent periods of
time. In some cases, users had to re-install the sensor. In other cases, users de-
cided to run the sensor on virtual machines, where the guest operating system is
Windows XP. This posed a data quality issue. User data collected from virtual
machines is only a subset of the user’s interaction with their personal computer.
Therefore, it may not fully reflect the user’s typical behavior. All these techni-
cal issues posed data sanitization challenges, which we present in the following
section.
3.4 Data Sanitization Challenges
Each installed sensor was given a unique sensor ID. Data collected from one
sensor was uploaded to a central server and stored under its own directory.
Many users had to to re-install the sensor due to some incompatibilities with
their operating system. Therefore, data belonging to one user was stored under
different directories. Linking or combining this data was not straightford was
in the absence of any user or system identification mechanism, other than the
sensor ID. Extensive data analysis was required to find clues that could be used
to link the data collected from one user.
Our sensors provided mechanisms for the users to protect their private data
and sanitize it if they wished to. Unfortunately, many users did not take advan-
tage of these mechanisms, either due to laziness, or due to lack of awareness of
the consequences of revealing their identities to the research and broader commu-
nities by sharing their data. It is also possible that users did not care about the
consequences if revealing their identity when their data was shared. Whatever
the reason was, we had a moral obligation of sanitizing the data and ensuring
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that the identities of the students were anonymized if possible. This proved to be
a major challenges because we did not know the names and user ids of our users.
In the absence of the list of user names and IDs, we had to manually review all
records of data collected and anonymize these user names and IDs wherever they
showed up, such as in file or directory names. This was a very time-consuming
process, and the results are probably less than fully-satisfactory.
4 Lessons Learned
After encountering all data collection challenges, we have learned some lessons
we share below:
– Initiate the IRB review process as early as possible and anticipate future
data and experiment needs of your research project.
– Identify the independent variable controlled in a user study and its dependent
variables
– When designing a user study, identify ways for baselining the users and
reducing variability, and especially user bias.
– List all the assumptions made about the participants in a user study. Ensure
the assumptions are described clearly in the user study scenario. For exam-
ple, does the participant know whether they are being monitored? Do they
know whether the system is baited?
– Ensure that all participants in a user study, who are willing to share their
data, take measures to sanitize their own data.
– Anticipate the technology market trends, and ensure that your data collec-
tion tools follow these trends.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented several challenges encountered during a data collec-
tion project for the evaluation of masquerade attack techniques. Challenges were
encountered in all phases of the data gathering project, including the concept,
design, and implementation phases. The data sanitization step also presented
its own challenges. We highlighted some lessons learned throughout the project.
We believe that data collection projects that involve human subjects, i.e. user
studies, require extensive planning. Many stakeholders are involved, including
the IRB. Many sources of variability should be controlled or eliminated, and
special efforts are required to reduce user bias and protect user privacy.
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